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Abstract
Decision aids, sometimes known as decision-support tools, are increasingly used to help patients to understand treatment 
options and to reach an informed decision consistent with their own values, yet methods for their economic evaluation have 
received limited attention. This is at odds with the increasingly rigorous methods being applied to assess the cost effective-
ness of other health technologies. This paper reviews current approaches to evaluating decision aids and proposes a new 
method for assessing their benefits relative to other interventions in a resource-constrained health system that seeks to improve 
health, equity and patient satisfaction. Current evaluation frameworks are found to be unsuitable for the economic evaluation 
of decision aids since their objectives are broader than health maximisation. Decision aids may generate significant non-
health benefits such as improved patient knowledge and satisfaction, which cannot be assessed using cost-utility analysis. 
A stated-preference consultation time trade-off (CTTO) is proposed in which a proportion of hypothetical physician con-
sultation is traded for use of the decision aid. A decision aid provides information for a patient to make an informed choice 
and therefore may be considered to be a substitute for physician time. The CTTO can be reported in consultation minutes 
or converted to monetary units using the cost of physician time. These values may be used, alongside the implementation 
cost, for economic evaluation.
Key Points for Decision Makers 
There are limitations with current methods to economi-
cally evaluate the benefits of decision aids.
A new approach is proposed that considers decision aids 
as a substitute for physician consultation to obtain health 
care information for informed decision making.
The consultation time-trade off (CTTO) allows the 
patient to express a preference for using the decision aid 
within the framework of opportunity cost.
1  Background
Decision aids, sometimes known as decision-support tools, 
are increasingly used within the healthcare system. They 
are employed to support patients to understand treatment 
options and to reach an informed decision consistent with 
their own values [1]. They may enhance the shared doc-
tor–patient decision-making process or allow patients to 
access information at their own leisure rather than within 
the constraint of a time-limited consultation. Alternatively, 
patients may not need a trained physician to understand 
some simpler health decisions, and their use may allow lim-
ited physician resources to be reemployed to more complex 
or more valuable tasks. Thus, decision aids have the poten-
tial to empower patients to make informed decisions on their 
own health and to reduce costs to the healthcare system: two 
important targets for health policy makers who generally 
count among their objectives improving health, equity and 
patient satisfaction. Furthermore, the use of decision aids 
may be desirable from an ethical and legal perspective by 
facilitating a higher legal standard of obtaining informed 
consent [2].
This paper defines a decision aid as a system that helps 
patients understand their disease management options to 
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make an informed healthcare decision consistent with their 
values. The decision aid may be designed for use by the 
patient on their own or for use by the patient and physi-
cian together. Decision aids may also refer to systems for 
physicians to better interact with patients and raise relevant 
issues. While these may have similar benefits for the patient 
in terms of improved decision making, they aim to improve 
the effectiveness of physicians themselves and can be viewed 
as a separate concept falling within the context of physician 
training. From a measurement point of view, a patient will 
find it harder to distinguish between the performance of a 
physician using the tool and their performance without it.
Evidence that decision aids increase the quality of the 
decision-making process and decision quality is growing. 
However, there is limited standardisation of the measure-
ment of their outcomes [3]. Assessments of the benefits of 
decision aids have focused on reporting improved patient 
knowledge, experience and satisfaction. A systematic review 
of the effects of decision aids identified 105 studies and 
found that decision aids increase people’s involvement and 
improve knowledge and realistic perception of outcomes [1].
A trial of shared decision-making and risk communica-
tion aids found that neither had an impact on patient health 
outcomes yet concluded that arguments for the techniques 
can be made from values and ethical principles set against 
cost [4]. Meanwhile, in a review of the impact of information 
provision on the health-related quality of life (HRQoL) of 
cancer survivors, only one of eight studies of interventions 
to increase health information showed a positive impact on 
HRQoL [5].
Decision aids have also been evaluated in terms of cost. 
An observational study of the use of a decision aid in choices 
on joint-replacement surgery found that the decision aid 
resulted in reduce rates of elective surgery and lower costs 
[6]. However, a systematic review of the impact of deci-
sion aids on costs to the healthcare system concluded that 
although patients chose more conservative disease manage-
ment options, there was limited evidence that implement-
ing decision-support interventions generated savings for the 
system [7].
Despite the range of outcomes that have been assessed, 
the full economic evaluation of decision aids provides a 
challenge for cost-utility analysis (CUA) using quality-
adjusted life-years (QALYs), the dominant framework used 
to economically evaluate health technologies. Consequently, 
decision aids are rarely economically evaluated with a view 
to their opportunity cost despite having recognised cost-
effectiveness implications for both the healthcare system and 
patients. This is at odds with increasingly rigorous methods 
being applied to assess the cost effectiveness of other health 
technologies [8].
There are currently just three published CUAs of decision 
aids. Trenaman et al. investigated the cost effectiveness of a 
decision aid in patients with obstructive sleep apnoea, find-
ing that use of the decision aid was dominated, incurring 
lower QALYs and higher costs, but noted that current meth-
ods to measure the outcomes of decision aids may under-
estimate their benefits [9]. Trenaman et al. [10] found that a 
decision aid for patients considering total joint replacement 
was dominant, since it was cost saving and produced a small 
(not statistically significant) QALY gain. Penton et al. [11] 
developed a hypothetical model of the cost effectiveness 
of a patient decision aid detailing the benefits and risks of 
bisphosphonates for patients with osteoporosis, finding the 
decision aid may have an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio 
below US$50,000/QALY.
Other economic evaluations of decision aids include Ken-
nedy et al. [12], which separately measured self-reported 
health status, treatments received and costs in a randomised 
controlled trial of decision aids for menorrhagia; Cantor 
et al. [13] which developed a model to calculate the cost per 
life-year saved of a decision aid for colorectal cancer screen-
ing; Tubeuf et al. [14] which assessed the incremental cost 
per first vaccine uptake; and Hollinghurst et al. [15] which 
conducted a cost-consequences analysis of a decision aid 
to support decisions on mode of delivery among women 
with a previous Caesarean section, where consequences 
were assessed in terms of decisional conflict and mode of 
delivery.
In a resource-constrained healthcare system, there is a 
need for the costs and benefits of interventions to be assessed 
in a manner that has cross-programme comparability in 
order to assess the opportunity cost of the forgone alternative 
to make the best use of limited resources [16]. This paper 
begins by considering the assessment of benefits of decision 
aids within the context of CUA, the dominant framework 
used by health technology assessment (HTA) agencies for 
economic evaluation. Limitations of this framework for the 
assessment of decision aids are identified. An alternative 
framework for the economic evaluation of decision aids is 
proposed that may be more consistent with the broader rea-
sons that decisions aids are employed within the healthcare 
system, including health gain, enhanced patient-centred 
decision making, knowledge of treatment options and deci-
sion satisfaction.
2  Current Framework: QALYs
QALYs are the most commonly used outcome in the 
denominator of the CUA in HTAs in developed countries 
and are an extra-welfarist approach. QALYs are calculated 
by weighting each year of life lived using a utility score. 
Utility scores are anchored so that 1 is perfect health and 
0 is equivalent to the state of death.
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The term ‘utility’ and its theory is based on von Neu-
mann-Morgenstern (vN-M) utility theory. The normative 
model for utility theory, the model for how a rational indi-
vidual ought to behave, is that utility scores represent the 
strength of an individual’s preference when faced with 
uncertainty for a given outcome, in this case, a health state 
[17]. Expected utility is the weighted sum of the utilities 
of all possible outcomes of a course of action, weighted 
by the probability of that outcome occurring.
Brouwer et al. [18] summarised the differences between 
welfarism and extra-welfarism using four characteristics: 
(1) the outcomes considered relevant in an evaluation, (2) 
the sources of valuation of the relevant outcomes, (3) the 
basis of weighting of relevant outcomes and (4) interper-
sonal comparisons. The QALY can be considered an extra-
welfarist approach since:
• it uses health as a measure of outcome;
• it permits the use of sources of valuation other than 
the affected individuals: general public are often pre-
ferred, although, in the subsequent example of QALYs 
for atrial fibrillation, patient preferences are used;
• it permits the weighting of outcomes according to prin-
ciples that need not be preference based;
• it permits interpersonal comparisons of well-being in a 
variety of dimensions, thus enabling movement beyond 
Paretian economics.
The purpose of a decision aid is generally to improve 
the decision-making process to enable the physician and 
the patient to come to the best choice among management 
options with different outcomes. The current framework 
aims to maximise health (QALY). It assumes that patients 
are ‘health maximisers’: that increased understanding of 
relative risks and benefits associated with each manage-
ment option would result in proportionally more patients 
choosing the decision that is associated with the largest 
health gain. Such a situation will be represented in CUA 
as a greater QALY gain (Eq. 1):
where EU is the expected utility, p1 is the probability of 
outcome 1, u1 is the utility of outcome 1, and n is the number 
of possible outcomes. The decision aid influences the prob-
ability that a particular outcome is chosen.
Robinson and Thomson [19] developed an expected 
utility approach for use within a decision-analysis frame-
work to integrate patient preferences with probabilistic 
information, which builds on the above methodology. They 
lay out the standard gamble as a technique for eliciting 
preferences for atrial fibrillation and warfarin anticoagu-
lation [19].
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3  Limitations with the Current Framework
It is increasingly acknowledged that the use of current 
evaluation frameworks that focus on health gain may not be 
appropriate to assess certain interventions in the healthcare 
system. Payne et al. [20] considered that complex interven-
tions may create challenges in two ways: the intervention 
may not fit into one of the current appraisal systems, and/
or maximising health is not the only objective. I argue that 
both apply to decision aids.
The QALY framework considers a ‘good’ decision one 
that produces the greatest health gain. However, decision 
aids are rarely implemented with the sole or even primary 
aim of generating a health benefit and the outcomes associ-
ated with use of a decision aid are likely to be broader than 
health.
Of the 105 studies of decision aids identified in the pre-
viously mentioned systematic review, 71 assessed knowl-
edge, 25 accurate risk perceptions, and 16 informed value-
based choice; 63 assessed decisional conflict, ten assessed 
patient–physician communication, 24 assessed patient par-
ticipation in decision making, 24 measured the proportion 
of participants undecided and 19 measured satisfaction with 
the choice or decision-making process. The impact of the 
decision aids on general or condition-specific health was 
only measured in 11 and 7 of the 105 studies, respectively. 
None of the studies included preference-based health out-
comes [1].
A focus on health gain alone is not necessarily consistent 
with the broader aims of physicians employed in the agency 
relationship. Agents are there to reduce the information gap 
present when patients make healthcare decisions or to act on 
a patient’s behalf by assuming their values. These two con-
cepts have been articulated in the decision-making literature 
by Bekker et al. [21], which considered an informed deci-
sion to be one “using relevant information about the advan-
tages and disadvantages of all possible courses of action” 
(informed) and “in accordance with personal beliefs” (based 
on the patient’s values).
Vick and Scott [22] highlighted the complexity of the 
agency relationship. They identified that being able to talk to 
the doctor was the most important attribute. Patients tended 
to prefer more information to less, but females and highly 
qualified respondents wanted to choose their own treatment 
[22].
In the current framework, the decision aid’s role is to 
increase the probability that a certain outcome is chosen to 
realise a greater QALY gain. As discussed, it is unclear that 
the objective of health gain is the only or even the main aim 
of the tool. By excluding other benefits within the broad 
umbrella of process of care, the utility of decision aids is 
likely to be undervalued.
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4  New Framework: Consultation Time
A new approach to measuring the benefits of decision aids 
should address the limitations of the current evaluation 
framework and the wider objectives of decision aids in help-
ing doctors and patients to come to a ‘good’ decision.
A decision aid can be seen as a substitute for physician 
time and therefore a new approach should consider this 
framework. The aims of a physician are broader than max-
imising health and it is unlikely that a physician consulta-
tion would be assessed by considering the probability that a 
certain outcome is chosen in order to generate more QALYs. 
As well as improving the health of a patient in the long term, 
in the short term, doctors are a provider of information and 
a reducer of anxiety regardless of the potential for health 
gain. Indeed, the agency model of the doctor–patient rela-
tionship assumes that physicians are employed by a patient 
to reduce the information gap between the patient and the 
disease management options [23].
Adequate physician consultation time has been shown 
to be associated with quality of care and patient satisfac-
tion as well as being an ethically important dimension of 
care. Patients seeking help from a doctor who spends more 
time with them are more likely to have a consultation that 
includes important elements of care [24]. Patients who 
believe their consultation lasted longer feel more satisfied 
[25]. Furthermore, sufficient consultation time is ethically 
important for the patient–physician relationship and can fos-
ter trust, maintain fidelity, demonstrate advocacy and dem-
onstrate respect for the patient [26].
By considering the decision aid in terms of the oppor-
tunity cost of physician consultation and as a substitute for 
physician time, an approach of valuing the tool against the 
next best alternative is likely to capture a more direct meas-
ure of the benefit and include more attributes of the ‘good’ 
decision (Eq. 2):
where EU is the expected utility, c is the utility of the physi-
cian consultation, t is time and d is the utility of the decision 
aid. The decision aid and physician consultation time are 
assumed to be perfect substitutes.
The consultation time trade-off (CTTO) requires the 
patient to choose between use of the decision aid and vary-
ing lengths of consultation time with a physician before 
they reach the point of indifference. A ping-pong technique 
within a hypothetical 10-min consultation is proposed, with 
10 min chosen as a length that patients will be familiar with 
for a consultation; however, the most appropriate length 
should be determined in pilot work with patients. The out-
put of the CTTO will be a number of minutes the patient 
would be willing to trade for use of the tool, equivalent to 
the opportunity cost of the tool expressed by its displaced 
(2)EU = c × t + d
alternative: physician consultation time. The approach fol-
lows the widely used time trade-off (TTO) [27], which is 
commonly used to elicit health preferences and forms the 
basis of the EuroQol 5-Dimensions (EQ-5D) utility scale 
[28].
As discussed, a successful decision aid and physician 
consultation have complementary aims, including improved 
quality of care, patient satisfaction and ethical informed con-
sent and therefore can be considered substitutes. The extent 
to which the two can be considered perfect substitutes will 
be determined in part by the attributes of the decision aid, 
which vary from decision aid to decision aid, and in part by 
the patient’s own attitude to shared decision making. Imper-
fect substitutes exhibit variable marginal rates of substitu-
tion along the consumer indifference curve. While this issue 
requires further investigation in real-world testing, it should 
be noted that the TTO has the same property affecting health 
state utility values used to estimate QALYs: that there is a 
curvature of the utility function for duration [29].
5  Application to Economic Evaluation
The benefit of the decision aid expressed in minutes can be 
directly compared against its cost (likely to include the cost 
of use and an appropriate proportion of implementation). 
Such a value would inform the amount of physician time 
that can be saved and redeployed to more complex tasks 
elsewhere in the healthcare system.
Alternatively, the number of physician minutes saved can 
be converted to a monetary value using the local wage rate 
of the physician that would have been employed on the task. 
This can then be applied to a cost–benefit analysis to allow 
comparability across healthcare programmes.
Placing the CTTO framework in a theoretical framework, 
Table 1 shows that the new approach may be considered 
within the extra-welfarist framework according to its key 
features [18], particularly due to its outcomes, which are 
bounded by consultation satisfaction, due to the possibil-
ity to weight outcomes (e.g. by different wage rates across 
medical specialties) and the possibility to make interper-
sonal comparisons.
6  Further Questions to Refine New 
Framework
Converting the CTTO to a monetary value has some impli-
cations in terms of the marginal value of a consultation to 
a patient, and therefore t in Eq. 2. The cost to the health-
care system of a physician consultation is constant if the 
physician is paid by time, so from the healthcare system 
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perspective, the value of the consultation is constant. How-
ever, it may be that, from the patient perspective, the ideal 
consultation has a diminishing marginal utility because the 
patient has their most important questions answered first. 
Further work would be recommended on the marginal value 
of a consultation if the monetary measure is equated to a 
patient utility value. The value of the use of decision aids 
may also be influenced by endogenous factors such as a 
patient’s health literacy and their preference towards mak-
ing their own decisions on treatment options compared with 
delegating the decision to their physician agent [30]. Patients 
with a higher propensity to make their own decisions on 
their health condition may find a greater benefit in decision 
aids. To address the latter, a stratification of decision-mak-
ing preferences such as the Degner scale could be a useful 
measure to prospectively determine whether the patient is 
likely to benefit from use of a decision aid or retrospectively 
conduct cost–benefit analysis in subgroups of patients with 
different capacities to benefit [31].
The value of decision aids may also be influenced by 
exogenous factors such as the quality of the doctor providing 
the hypothetical substitute consultation. A patient who has 
experienced higher-quality doctor–patient encounters may 
be less inclined to trade this for time with the decision aid. 
This is addressed in the introduction to the tool by empha-
sising that the consultation is hypothetical and would be 
sufficient to answer a patient’s questions to their satisfaction.
Literature on the impact of decision aids on consultation 
time in the real world is unclear: eight studies found no 
difference, whereas two studies found a median increase 
of 2.6 min [1]. However, it should be noted that one of the 
studies reporting an increase included a cognitively chal-
lenging standard gamble that may have raised additional 
questions for respondents [32]. In some cases, this could be 
that the decision aid is not providing the necessary infor-
mation and adding confusion that has to be clarified by the 
doctor. In most cases, the decision aid likely increases the 
knowledge of the patient, so they have more questions for 
the doctor. Indeed, evidence that decision aids increase 
knowledge is strong, and it may be hypothesised that a 
more knowledgeable patient is more empowered to ask 
further questions.
In any case, both of these scenarios should be measur-
able by the theoretical CTTO. A poor decision aid that adds 
confusion would lead to a first choice of ‘doctor’ (Fig. 1a) 
followed by agreeing to trade no consultation time for the 
tool (Fig. 1b). A good decision aid that increases patient 
knowledge will require a longer physician consultation to 
compensate the patient.
The preferences derived from the CTTO are those of 
the patient. Due to the unique combination of attributes of 
each decision aid, direct user experience is required to make 
an accurate trade-off. In contrast, economic evaluation of 
health technologies is often recommended from the pub-
lic perspective using general public preferences for health 
states expressed from behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ [33]. This 
difference may limit the direct comparability of economic 
evaluation of decision aids using the CTTO with those using 
other measures that take the public perspective.
Finally, the time at which the CTTO is asked requires 
consideration in relation to ex ante and ex post utility. 
Administering the CTTO soon after the decision aid has 
been used, means that patients are likely to have the clear-
est recollection of the decision itself. Having said this, the 
full evaluation of the tool may incorporate the downstream 
implications of the decision, for example after the patient 
has undergone an elective surgical procedure and the health 
consequences have been realised. The former, ex ante, 
application would be recommended for consistency with 
expected utility theory. Use of the CTTO after the health 
consequences have been realised would derive experience 
utilities [34], which may not be consistent with expected 
utility used in other healthcare decision-making contexts.
Other possible frameworks could be considered, such as 
contingent valuation (CV) or discrete-choice experiment 
(DCE), but I argue that neither of these are satisfactory. The 
use of CV in evaluations of healthcare is limited since the 
approach suffers from measurement biases related to the 
valuation of outcomes that are unfamiliar to respondents, 
small probabilities and lengthy time horizons of outcomes 
[35]. Bozic et al. [36] asked patients to rank and attribute 
a monetary value to decision aids in orthopaedic surgery. 
However, the study found binary results between patients 
Table 1  Summary of quality-adjusted life-year and consultation time trade-off frameworks
CTTO consultation time trade-off, QALY quality-adjusted life-year
Feature of extra-welfarist framework QALY CTTO
Outcomes other than utility are permitted Health Consultation satisfaction
Sources of valuation other than the affected individuals are permitted Affected individu-
als or others
Affected individuals
Weighting of outcomes according to principles that need not be preference based is permitted Permitted Permitted
Interpersonal comparisons of well-being in a variety of dimensions are permitted Permitted Permitted
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Fig. 1  Consultation time trade-
off: Introduction and first three 
questions
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who had no willingness to pay and those who expressed a 
willingness to pay in the range of $US50–500.
DCEs lack cross-program comparability, which is impor-
tant for healthcare decision making. DCEs have addressed 
this issue by including a monetary attribute. However, this 
leads to the same challenges for measuring health in mon-
etary terms as faced by CV. Cheraghi-Sohi et al. [37] elicited 
patient priorities for attributes of primary care consultations 
in the UK but acknowledged that the monetary attribute may 
lack validity where patients do not routinely pay for care.
The CTTO remains a conceptual framework and, to 
operationalise the approach, real-world testing alongside a 
decision aid would need to be conducted to determine the 
validity and responsiveness of the CTTO in a patient setting. 
This would involve the administration of the CTTO in a two-
arm trial with and without a decision aid. The length of phy-
sician consultation and other outcomes such as knowledge 
and decision regret would need to be included in the study 
to establish the validity of the CTTO against established 
outcome measures.
7  Conclusion
Decision aids have the potential to facilitate healthcare deci-
sion making. However, due to the non-health attributes of 
decision making and the difficulty associating the decision 
with future health gain (or loss), current methods of eco-
nomic evaluation are ill suited to evaluate them. While there 
may be practical reasons for conducting a CUA on decision 
aids, previous work has shown the approach to be incapable 
of capturing the full benefits of such interventions. The pro-
posed new approach based on trading off physician consulta-
tion time allows decision aids to be economically evaluated 
within the framework of opportunity cost, which has the 
potential to support the healthcare system in achieving its 
aims of improving health, equity and patient satisfaction.
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